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Abstract 
Last 20 years’ China’s economic growth and technological catchup is through their ‘go-global’ 
policy promoting investment abroad. This policy developed foundations for establishment of 
high technology industries and world leading research. We find that across China, the ‘go-
global’ policy needs support from provincial governments in terms of human capital, basic 
research and infrastructure to ensure that imported technology is effectively absorbed into the 
local economies. This means a national strategy needs local tuning to the needs of the region.  
Across all provinces, we find that during the period 2006 to 2016 outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) spillovers have a significant and positive impact on technology innovation 
as measured by patents. OFDI alone is insufficient and may crowd out local research and 
development (R&D), as such, those provinces need to get to a threshold of absorptive capacity 
in basic, applied research supported by human capital and R&D capital stock. When the gap 
between a province and the rest of the world is large then OFDI could have a crowding out 
effect without the province supporting basic research. We test for structural changes across all 
provinces by classifying them by either having large or small frontier technology, the proxy 
for absorptive capacity. We find that the role of human capital and basic research changes 
substantially between small gap and large gap provinces indicating that regional policy makers 
need to ensure that policies are fine tuned to the stage of development in a particular region 
and will change over time. OFDI effects are diminished as the provinces gap reduces and this 
may be particularly timely in the face of China being subject to increasing trade and investment 
pressure internationally. 
Key words: Technological innovation, government policy, OFDI spillovers, technology gap, 
threshold effect, basic research and applied research. 
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In 1999 China unveiled a ‘go-global’ strategy to replace investment driven economic growth 
with innovation driven growth that would place China at the centre of global economic and 
political influence. This policy is one of the major institutional push factors for Chinese 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) as in the following year, OFDI flows grew by 
14.27% from $4.036 billion. By 2016, OFDI has overtaken Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
(IFDI) in China in terms of its value, share of gross fixed capital formation and the share of 
Chinese national output. As of 2018, 43,000 Chinese OFDI enterprises operated in 188 
countries with a staggering investment flow of $143.04 billion (Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce, 2020).  
There are number of pull factors behind the exponential Chinese OFDI growth among which 
include technology seeking, efficiency seeking and asset seeking. Interested readers can consult 
Acs et al. (2001), Mathews (2006) and Rui and Yip (2008) for more details on these 
motivations. The Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of foreign affairs established a catalogue 
which acted as the instrument of OFDI approval. In this catalogue technologically advanced 
countries in Europe, North and South America and Asia and Pacific were targeted in order to 
invest in capital and technologically intensive industries.  Mathews (2006) described Chinese 
companies’ participation in these sectors as ‘skilful learning and adoption-cum-adaptation of 
advanced technologies’.  
Paul and Benito (2017) theorizes OFDI using a conceptual framework titled antecedents, 
decisions and outcomes (ADO). The main outcomes according to the authors are around 
innovation, knowledge transfer and reverse knowledge transfer. A growing body of literature 
now looks at the outcomes of OFDI rather than the antecedents and factors (See Hong et al., 
2019; Huang and Wang, 2009; Lyles et al., 2014). These studies look at the technology spill 
over effects of OFDI through the learning channel and technology gap between the home and 
host country. For instance, Lyles et al. (2014) found that OFDI increases firms’ absorptive 
capacity. Furthermore, Huang and Wang (2009) found that OFDI is positively related to 
innovation in China by firms’ patent applications and licensing. Hong et al. (2019) concludes 
that OFDI in developed countries promotes innovation in regions in China with the technology 
gap benefits from innovation.  
From an Institutional Theory (IT) point of view, national and subnational institutions play an 
important role in governing firm’s behaviour (See North (1990) for more details). In order for 
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local firms to fully engage and take advantage of China’s ‘go-global’ policy and its ecosystem, 
the parallel development of national and subnational policies are paramount. However, as 
documented by Xu (2011), Boisot and Meyer (2008) and Meyer et al. (2009), China suffers 
from a fragmented domestic economy, regional inequalities, incompatible subnational policies, 
infrastructure and infostructure. The impact of these institutional policy differences across 
regions have a significant impact on the levels of OFDI, innovation, technology absorptive 
capacity of firms and resulting technological spillovers.    
This paper empirically investigates the role of OFDI in fostering technological innovation and 
spillovers for the Chinese economy when regional differences in capabilities exist as a result 
of national and regional policy differentials. To date empirical work connecting OFDI to 
technological innovation and technological spillovers are relatively scarce. Through this study, 
we explore how regional differences in technology absorption thresholds affect the level of 
technological innovation and spillovers. This study stands out from other existing research in 
a number of dimensions. First, using regional level data for China, we determine the extent to 
which OFDI boosts innovation in China. Second, we investigate the extent to which inherent 
regional differences in the technological absorption threshold affect levels of innovation and 
technological spillovers from OFDI. Finally, we explore the role of the heterogeneous regional 
technology gap with the rest of world in influencing the level of OFDI, applied and basic 
research outcomes. 
This paper contributes to the literature by developing an understanding of China’s strategy to 
importing technological knowhow and so maintain growth across all its provinces. One of the 
characteristics of China’s strategy is to develop the provinces to such a level as to. Be able to 
take up technological innovation efficiently. We demonstrate a threshold effect where a 
foundational level of development is required in the provinces prior to exploiting OFDI 
channels. Our innovation is that basic research, applied research and OFDI have different joint 
impacts on technological innovation based regional technology gaps. This influences the 
political decision making at both provincial and national levels by determining the funding and 
deployment of foundational applied research. It also determines levels of infrastructure and 
human capital development required in the provinces.   
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we review the existing literature following 
the development of the hypotheses in section 3. We then describe our methodological 
framework in detail with a brief summary of the data sources in Section 4. Section 5 reports 
the results and their interpretation. Finally, in Section 6 we provide policy implications and 
conclusions.  
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and technological catch-up 
One of the key motives for OFDI is to seek technological know-how, referred to in the 
international business (IB) literature as ‘technology-seeking’. Awate et al. (2012) distinguishes 
between imitation and innovation using the concept of output-catch-up and innovation catch-
up. The former relates to closing of the output gap between an EMNE and their advanced 
country counterparts by learning the technology and processes relating to the currently 
observable output frontiers while the latter relates to ‘enhancement and development of the 
currently observable product or service’ Awate et al. (2012).  It can be established that output 
catch-up is the result of the innovation gaps between the EMNE (both the headquarter and 
subsidiary) which incentivise the EMNE to mimic in order to achieve parity while the 
innovation catch-up contributes to the development of applied and basic research enhancing 
innovation by the EMNE. Under this approach the main strategy used in research and 
development by Chinese OFDI is competencies creation (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005, 2011).    
The process of knowledge transfers and technological catchup of Chinese enterprises has two 
channels. The first is through internalisation of technological know-how by firms engaged in 
OFDI, so that it can transfer this knowledge to domestic headquarters resulting in reverse 
technology spillovers.  The local headquarters are likely to undertake applied research and 
basic research to strengthen their local and international competitiveness. This creates a wider 
technology gap locally incentivising firms to react through research and development. The 
second channel is through local firms learning from their foreign trading partners. As stated by 
Clegg and Voss (2018) and Hensmans and Liu (2018), local Chinese firm’s interaction with 
foreign firms allows them to leverage the learning achieved through them to become MNEs, 
thereby increasing the size of Chinese OFDI. Therefore, the level of innovation has a two-way 




2.2  Absorptive capacity and innovation 
Innovation associated with reverse technology spillovers requires OFDI firms to have some 
degree of absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity of firms has a direct link to the level of the 
technology gap that prevails between the EMNE and firms in advanced economies. Hong et. 
al (2019) describe the technology gap as the ‘observed distance of technical efficiency, 
knowledge or technology level, managerial skills and productivity’ between the EMNE and 
firms in the markets. The channel through which absorptive capacity feeds into innovation is 
through R&D activities aimed to close the technology gap by integrating foreign technologies. 
For instance, Japan’s technological development had a significant contribution from imported 
technologies which was absorbed by domestic firms that enhanced the level of innovation.  A 
number of empirical studies have established a link between imported technologies and 
domestic R&D activities (Pack and Saggi, 1997). 
In the literature, there is no consensus on the optimal technology gap required and the 
technology threshold EMNEs need to reach before the benefits of technology transfer on 
innovation can be realised.  Hausman et al. (2005) stated that for technological transfer to occur, 
its essential to develop absorptive capacity. Furthermore, Glass and Saggi (1998) advocated 
that there exists a threshold level in terms of current technology and the human capital firms 
needs to establish in order for it to benefit from technology spillover effects. The threshold 
level determines how efficiently firms can manage new knowledge and apply it to innovation.  
Edamura et al., (2014) find that at firm level data supports the hypothesis that firms achieve 
their goals with OFDI whereas Bai (2009) concludes that these reverse spillovers into 
technological innovations are not significant. In contrast, Li et al. (2016b) identify that there is 
a significant difference in OFDI spillovers from east to western China, with the effects being 
more limited in the west. Furthermore, R&D and human capital have much greater effects than 
OFDI indicating that these are critical channels for China to progress. Another is the OFDI 
effects in both the short and long run, Yang et al. (2011) identified that the results are regional 
and relative to the level of development. This view is supported by Bruce and Chang (1991) 
and Rudy et al. (2016), that the heterogeneous nature of firms and regions in their technology 





A technology gap index is the basis for absorptive capacity in IFDI spillover analysis, hence 
we apply the same index to OFDI. A wide technology gap is most likely to encourage imitation 
that can lead to a narrowing of the gap and improve absorptive efficiency, hence capacity 
(Verspagen, 1992; Glass and Saggi, 1998; Girma et al., 2001). Most empirical studies are at a 
national level (Liu et al., 2005; Buckley et al., 2007). This may lead to variable results due to 
the limitations in aggregation at a national level that largely compromise any conclusions 
(Sonnenschein, 1973).  
Several empirical papers on Chinese FDI exists in the literature. Table 1 succinctly summarises 
the most recent literature on FDI and technology spillovers. This empirical paper contributes 
to the literature by establishing the level of technological threshold the Chinese firms engage 
with before OFDI is realised and can then benefit from technological innovation.  
Table 1 - OFDI and innovation review of the recent literature 
Study Method  Time  Sample Region Outcomes 
Acs et al. 
(2002) 





Patents are a reasonable proxy for 
innovation, however, silent 
economic value to economy. 
Borensztei









For developing countries FDI is an 
important tool for the transfer of 
technology and contributes to 








1978 -1994 217  84 Swedish 
firms 
There is a strong positive 
relationship between OFDI and 
technology spillover effect. 










China Technological innovation can be 
boosted by  IFDI  with a positive 








4,000 plants Venezuela That FDI/FII does not lead to 












Human capital and income have a 
positive effect on technology 
adoption. 
Lee (2006) Dynamic 
OLS 
1981-2000 320 16 OECD 
countries 
The IFDI affects international 
knowledge spillovers. 





2003- 2013 290 29 Chinese 
provinces 
OFDI benefits from reverse 
knowledge spillover when the 
technology gap between a 
province and MNEs' host 
countries. Double-threshold 
effects of technology gaps.  
Pavitt et al. 
(1987) 
OLS 1945-1983. 4000 
innovations 
UK U-Shaped relation between firm’s 






1985-2008 696 29 Chinese 
provinces 
Double-threshold effects of 
regional innovation on 
productivity spillovers from FDI. 
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Study Method  Time  Sample Region Outcomes 






1986-2011 128 8 ASEAN 
countries 
Both IFDI and outward OFDI 
have a positive impact on the gross 
domestic investment. 





2000 -2011 360 30 Chinese 
provinces  
The FDI technology spillover has 
two threshold effects of the 
technology gap in China. 
Zhou et al. 
(2019) 
FGLS  2004-2014 341 31 Chinese 
provinces  
The relation between OFDI and 
domestic innovation is positive in 
developing countries but negative 
in emerging markets. 
 
3 Hypotheses, theoretical framework and methodological approach 
3.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1): Chinese OFDI boosts domestic technological innovation 
 The ability of Chinese transnational firms to absorb all the technology and use it to increase 
innovation depends on the infrastructure, current technology levels, human capability and, 
willingness to learn and develop (Bitzer and Kerekes, 2008; Li et al., 2016a).  While many of 
these studies have concluded that significant technology gaps are likely to moderate the effects 
of OFDI (Wang et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016a), the data used in these studies are dated and 
potentially less useful in establishing the heterogeneity of provinces. Intuitively, one needs to 
consider the role of regional development in terms of both human and technological capital for 
technological absorption. 
To establish the relationship between OFDI and domestic technological innovation, one needs 
to observe a measure for technological advancement. Following Griliches (1979), Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) and Acs et al. (2002) and the general trend in the literature, we use as a proxy 
the intellectual property (IP) measure (authorized patents). A core driver for IP is domestic 
R&D (RD) supported by human capital development (HC) and the three channels for 
international spillovers: IFDI, imports (IM) and exports (EX) (van Pottelsberghe and 
Lichtenberg, 2001; Li et al., 2016b; Filippetti et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2019). We take logs of 
all variables to form the linear model:  
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where the dependent variable is 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 which is the number of authorised patents in province 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡, 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the total inward foreign direct investment to China, 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the total exports, 
𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the total imports, 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 inward foreign direct investment from country 𝑖 to China, 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 
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is the human capital level and 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑠  is the stock of R&D investment, 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the total outward 
foreign direct investment from China.  
As stated already, we use the flow of authorised patents as the proxy for the flow of 
technological development following Griliches (1979), Li et al. (2016a), Hong et al. (2019) 
and Zhou et al. (2019). This could be somewhat problematic in that patents are not necessarily 
of the same technological benefit nor do they cover all development (Griliches, 1990; Arundel, 
2001; Cuddington and Moss, 2001). The alternative is R&D expenditure which measures only 
the resources put towards development which may not account for beneficial outcomes. 
Furthermore, accounting practices may differ across firms and lead to inconsistent results.  
Although IP is potentially problematic as a proxy, it is from a primary source which is not 
reliant on differences in reporting. It is likely to understate the level of development, thus 
amplifying the effect of the inputs. Many of these criticisms are overcome by Li et al., (2016a) 
and overall it is accepted in the literature as a reasonable proxy. 
When it comes to R&D, then we use the depreciated stock of all accumulated R&D investments 
in a province at time t. Treating R&D as an inventory, we write the equation for motion of 
R&D using Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (2009) as: 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑒         (2) 
where 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑠  is the R&D inventory in province 𝑖 at time t,  𝛿 is the R&D depreciation rate and 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑒   is the R&D expenditure in province 𝑖 at time 𝑡. We normalise all R&D to 2006 prices. 
This implies that for a province to grow R&D inventory then 𝛿𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 < 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑂. This presents a 
problem, although we know the investment per period, we do not know the R&D stock. Again 







           (3) 






and then rolling 
forward (3) above to calculate every year’s total R&D investment stock. By summing the 
provinces per period it provides the Chinese total level of R&D investment stock, formally: 
𝑅𝐷𝑡
𝑠 = ∑ 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑆
𝑖∈𝐼           (4) 
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We construct OFDI using the two step process set out in van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg 
(2001), Hong et al. (2019) and Zhou et al. (2019). Firstly, the domestic OFDI related R&D 





𝑠          (5) 
where 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡  is the R&D stock China obtains from its OFDI towards country 𝑗 in year 𝑡 and 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡  is the GDP of country 𝑗 in year 𝑡. We translate nominal into real by dividing 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡  
by 𝑃𝑗𝑡 . The 𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑠  is the R&D stock of the country 𝑗 at the time 𝑡, it can be obtained using the 
same method as above: 
𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑠 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑅𝐷𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝑅𝐷𝑗,𝑡
𝑒        (6) 
where 𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑠  is the R&D inventory in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡,  𝛿 is the R&D depreciation rate and 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑒   is the R&D expenditure in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡. Then the OFDI of the province is calculated 
by using the proportion of province OFDI stock relative to the domestic one.  
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 ×
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑖
        (7) 
3.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2): That OFDI spillover is dependent on an absorptive 
capacity threshold 
The absorptive capacity constrains the effectiveness of FDI. Absorptive capacity is a function 
of R&D investment stock and human capital (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Dussauge et al., 
2000; Glass and Saggi, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). In equation (1), we control for the 
heterogeneity by the fixed effects model. If the OFDI’s coefficient for a province is significant 
and positive, then OFDI has an impact on technological development. To resolve this, we need 
to employ a threshold model to understand if thresholds exist and at what level. Equation (8) 
sets a threshold (TH) and determines the OFDI coefficient below and above that threshold. If 
a threshold exists and is significant in both coefficients then we check for two thresholds and 
so on (Wang, 2015; Li et al., 2016b). We employ the fixed-effects threshold model described 
in Hansen (1999, 2000).  
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚,𝑖,𝑡𝑚∈𝑣 𝑣𝑚,𝑖,𝑡   + ∑ 𝛽𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡(𝜃𝑘−1 < 𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝜃𝑘  )
𝐾+1
𝑘=1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (8) 
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚,𝑖,𝑡𝑚∈𝑣 𝑣𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡(𝜃1 > 𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ×
𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡(𝜃1 ≤ 𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡        (9) 
𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = {𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡, 𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡}  
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𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = {𝑃𝐺𝑖,𝑡, 𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡} 
𝜃 = {−∞, 𝜃1, … , ∞} 
where 𝐾 + 1 is the length of set 𝜃, elements 𝜃1 … are threshold parameters, 𝑃𝐺 is the 
productivity gap and 𝑇𝐻 is the threshold variable computed following the Hansen 
methodology. Note that if 𝑅𝐷 or 𝐻𝐶 is the threshold variable then it does not appear in the 
linear part of the model.  We use the three proxies to represent the technology gap - productivity 
gap, human capital and R&D stock. For the productivity gap (𝑃𝐺), we follow Kokko (1994), 
Castellani and Zanfei (2003) and Hong et al (2019), which involves the use of real GDP.  For 
human capital, we follow Glass and Saggi (1998), Zahra and George (2002), Comin and Hobijn 
(2004), and Zhou et al., (2019) to measure the absorptive capacity. Meanwhile, the R&D effort, 
spending on training and the ability to hire a well-educated labour force indicates the resources 
that a firm has (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Glass and Saggi, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). 
We apply the productivity gap, R&D stock and human capital to observe if technological 
absorptive capacity has a threshold effect. 
This treatment on ‘clustering’ similar firms in geographical regions mirrors what has been 
observed throughout the industrial age. Prior empirical studies do not take into account the 
‘threshold’ level for absorptive capacity which lays the ‘foundations’ for development. The 
following hypothesis describe the motivation for the use of the threshold level.  
3.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3): Regional differences in research and OFDI impact levels 
of technological innovation 
Our approach is to utilise the thresholds from H2 to classify provinces into two groups based 
on the technology gap - large and small technology gap. This allows us to study causation 
between absorptive capacity and OFDI spillovers in greater depth. Furthermore, this causal 
relationship influences the technological innovation incentive effect of basic research. A non-
significant threshold does not necessarily imply thresholds have no effect. Instead, we should 
expect that a small technology gap would lead to lower acquisition of technology spillovers 
suggesting that the absorptive capacity is not being fully utilised (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; 
Martínez-Senra et al., 2015).  
Salter and Martin (2001) identify that scientific research including applied and foundational or 
basic research is core to moving technological innovation forward. As in Nelson (1959), the 
difference between applied research, focusing on practical inventions and product 
development, and basic research in its effects on absorption and innovation capacity indicates 
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that basic research is the foundation for absorptive capacity. Therefore, as these two forms of 
research have different but joint effects and there is little in the way of recent research on these 
effects, we need to consider the relative roles of applied and basic research, so we add a 
subsidiary to this hypothesis to clarify the distinct and joint impacts. 
Foundational or basic research tends to be riskier, more expensive and lengthy than applied 
research thus governments tend to conduct or fund this type of research with the intention of 
producing spillovers into the private sector2 (Nelson, 1959). The government is able to take on 
much greater risks and deploy greater resources to attain research objectives. Therefore, the 
private sector tends to focus on applied research that it can turn into marketable intellectual 
property and profitable products arising out of the work of government.  
We utilise the Arrow (1972) and Park (1998) model extended by Cassiman et al. (2002), 
Henard and McFadyen (2005) and Gulbrandsen and Kyvik (2010) to explore the impact of 
applied and basic research on knowledge creation and technological spillovers. The model 
specifies the interaction between applied and basic research, the models include the provincial 
government (state) investment, measures of infrastructure development (road pavement) and 
per capita GDP to determine the province’s technological development. We specify the model 
thus:  
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌11 + 𝜌11𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌12𝐴𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌13𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌14𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌15𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌16𝑝𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝜌17𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         (10) 
where 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 are as before,  𝐴𝑖𝑡  and 𝐵𝑖𝑡 are the applied basic research respectively. 
Basic Research is research that tries to expand the already existing scientific knowledge base 
largely on a theoretical basis whereas applied research solves real-life problems using scientific 
study, that is by developing practical solutions to real-world problems. The interaction term 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑖𝑡 represents the incentive innovation effect of basic research. We control for the 
number employed (𝐻𝑖𝑡), provincial government investment in fixed assets (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡), the per 
capita real GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡), and as a proxy for infrastructure the paved roads area (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡) 
following Higón (2016). The 𝑢𝑖 is the provincial fixed effect and the 𝑣𝑡 is the time fixed effect. 
 
2 Examples are in Space exploration where governments took the lead and eventually, we will observe the 
commercialisation by the private sector. This also include military research stemming back to the basics of radar, 
sonar, GPS providing the foundations for much applied research. Much foundational medical research is 
government funded particularly in the areas of vaccines and genetics.  
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However, we need to determine the level of applied research 𝐴𝑖𝑡, we do this by the process 
developed by Nelson (1959) by estimating the equation: 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌21𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌22𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌23𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌24𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   (11) 
and 𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 indicates the absorptive effect of OFDI spillovers of basic research. Note that  
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡  and 𝐴𝑖𝑡  occur in both 10 and 11 creating an endogeneity problem that we solve by using 
three stage least squares (3SLS).  
4 Methodology and data 
4.1 Econometric approach 
To the existing empirical framework, we introduce methodological innovations to capture the 
technology spillover effects and extend the Chinese Provincial panel dataset (in Appendix A) 
to test the three hypotheses outlined above.  
We collect additional data from various sources and merge them into a panel dataset with the 
same timeframe and provinces. Appendix A reports summary statistics and other tests on the 
dataset for validation. We use unit root tests such as Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003), Fisher 
ADF and Fisher PP, Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001), to test for stationary in the panel 
data for each series. We then determined the lag length to be used to test the hypotheses using 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
Starting with H1, we test for the direct impact of OFDI on technological innovation in a 
province with and without lags. As this is a panel, we use the Hausman test, as suggested by 
Wu (1973), and Hausman (1978), to exclude pooled and random effects. If this is the case, then 
this implies that H1 is more suited to the fixed effects analysis.  
Moving next to H2, where thresholds are important to our analysis, we apply the Hansen (1999, 
2000) method to identify any threshold effects with their confidence bands for the threshold 
parameter. This provides a method for endogenously estimating the threshold level and its 
significance in a non-linear specification. The determination of thresholds begins with 
identifying the first significant threshold then finding the second significant threshold and so 
on until there are no more significant thresholds. 
Finally, as H3 involves simultaneous equations, it poses an endogeneity problem that can lead 
to over identification. To overcome this, we used 3SLS. An F-test on the first stage identifies 
if it addresses the issue of endogeneity. For consistency we expect an F-stat of greater than 10. 
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We separate the provinces into two groups, namely, large and small technology gaps3 as 
identified from H2. We expect basic and applied research to have lagged effects. We introduce 
controls for the one period and two period lagged values of applied and basic research 
respectively. In addition, we control for differences in the provincial and national economic 
factors, to control for the individual fixed effect and time fixed effects. We add to this 
hypothesis a subsidiary hypothesis to further explain the dynamics. 
4.2 Data  
We utilize a panel of 31 Chinese provinces covering the time period 2006 to 2016 including 
all the above variables sourced principally from the Chinese year book. We add in the controls 
such as employment, government investment, output and infrastructure. We normalize all 
prices to 2006 international US dollars. Prior to 2006 data for some provinces such as Xinjiang 
and Tibet is somewhat limited so not included. Furthermore, this extends and updates the 
studies by Hong et al. (2019), Xia et al. (2016) and Li et al. (2016b) by using a more 
comprehensive dataset with significant methodological extensions. For a detailed analysis of 
the data sources and issues refer to the Appendix A.  
5 Results 
We report the results from our empirical analysis of the three hypotheses here in the same order 
as specified in the methodology section above. 
5.1 Panel data tests and results 
The results of the unit root test and the AIC determined lags tests are reported in Table 2. The 
results rule out the presence of a unit root in the data. Furthermore, results indicate lags between 
1 and 3 are the most relevant for dynamic equation analysis. 
Table 2- Unit Root and AIC results 
Variable Levin, Lin & Chu Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
PP – Fisher Chi-
square 
Lags 
𝐼𝑃  -12.25*** -1.51*** 97.31*** 132.02*** 3 
𝑅𝐷  -24.77*** -11.89 244.36*** 292.60*** 1 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼  -5.74*** -0.87 69.78 57.63 1 
𝐼𝑀  -9.10*** -0.35*** 93.72*** 144.50*** 1 
𝐸𝑋  -27.86*** -6.38*** 169.34*** 102.18*** 3 
 
3 The Technology gap is a measure of the level of technological development as benchmarked with the rest of the 
world, particularly the main trading partners.  
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𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼  -31.18 -5.11*** 138.31*** 153.75*** 3 
𝐴  -21.36*** -11.28*** 231.99*** 275.67*** 1 
𝐵  -23.11 -11.52*** 234.62*** 323.18*** 1 
𝐺𝐴𝑃 -39.91*** -27.66*** 418.05*** 417.22*** 1 
𝐻𝐶  -6.39*** -1.82** 87.87** 35.83 1 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
5.2 OFDI spillovers boosts technological innovation  
Table 3 reports the OLS regressions, fixed effects and random effect models that test H1. We 
observe that the Hausman test confirms that the fixed effects model is preferable to the 
OLS/pooled and random effects models. R&D is the main driver of technological innovation 
as one would expect. Regarding OFDI, this is both positive and significant in both the level 
and lag models indicating that OFDI has both an immediate and lasting effect on technological 
innovation, albeit small compared to R&D. This effect is observed across all provinces 
indicating that the Chinese government strategy of ‘go-global’ to the private sector has a 
materially positive impact on domestic innovation. Note that in the lagged OFDI models where 
OFDI plays a more significant role than the R&D role, it is about 12% less indicating that OFDI 
is more important than R&D. This would lead us to conclude that some level of R&D needs to 
be present for OFDI to be effective. We will explore this further in the next hypothesis.  
Significance levels reported in Table 3 reinstate the hypothesis that R&D and OFDI are the 
most significant determinants of regional innovation. When discussing innovation, one needs 
to be cautious that imitation of a technology does not necessarily equate with innovation. While 
IFDI builds the technological base through imitation, OFDI through direct investment, joint 
ventures and partnerships facilitates transfer of knowledge and hence innovation. Our findings 
on OFDI as the mechanism that enhance knowledge transfer and innovation align with 
Piperopoulos et al. (2018). 
As described in the introduction, for OFDI to feed into domestic innovation there is a 
subsequent time lag. The dynamic panel regression reported in Table 3 columns 4 to 8 explores 
this structure which incorporates one period and two period lags into the estimation. We note 
that in Table 3 the first and second lags individually (t-1 and t-2) are significant and positive 
and the lagged coefficients are increasing with time. Combining both lags into a single 
regression rules out the significance of the OFDI effect on innovation during present and lagged 
periods. However, a joint hypothesis test with two lags in Table 4 reveals joint significance 
indicating that OFDI has to be sustained over time to have a marked effect on domestic 
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innovation. The policy implication is that the government needs to have a sustained consistent 
outward investment policy over many years for the Chinese economy to benefit from 
innovation associated with OFDI.  
Table 3 - China's provincial effects on Innovation and OFDI 












𝑹𝑫 1.06*** 0.90*** 0.60*** 0.64*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 
𝑰𝑭𝑫𝑰 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
𝑰𝑴 -0.15* -0.11 -0.08* -0.05 0.003 -0.05 -0.001 -0.01 
𝑬𝑿 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰 0.05** 0.04** 0.11***   0.05 0.02 0.04 
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰−𝟏 
 
   0.09***  0.05  0.04 
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰−𝟐 
 
    0.11***  0.11*** 0.12*** 
𝑯𝑪 -1.36*** -0.38 -0.38 -0.21 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32 0.26 
𝑪 -0.64 -2.37*** 1.47 -0.15 0.83 0.67 1.26 0.50 
𝑹𝟐 0.91 0.90 0.98 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87 
𝑭 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 691.21*** 679.48*** 109.92*** 337.24*** 257.35*** 290.31*** 219.91*** 192.14*** 
𝑯𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕1   17.91***      
𝑯𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕2   30.92***      
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS= Ordinary Least-squares, 
FE= Fixed effects, RE= Random effects, Hausman Test1= FE VS RE and Hausman Test2= FE to OLS.  
Table 4 - Joint significance test results  
Wald Test  FE(t,t-1) FE(t,t-2) FE (t,t-1,t-2) 
𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  7.26*** 7.65*** 5.24*** 
𝜒2 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 14.51*** 15.29*** 15.73*** 
In Table 4, we observe that R&D is significant in all cases. However, if we take into account 
the level and lagged OFDI, then the magnitude of the coefficient decreases indicating that 
OFDI has a role over time of about one quarter of that of domestic R&D. This supports the 
normative approach that both domestic R&D and sustained OFDI need to be present to increase 
domestic innovation.  
IFDI and exports have little impact on innovation outcomes leading us to believe that foreign 
controlled investment and exports use productive capacity rather than innovative capacity. 
16 
 
They have little domestic benefit other than the streams of income from exports cause the 
labour force employment to increase (Wei, 2010). As our focus is on OFDI, we shall leave that 
issue for other studies. Likewise, the coefficient on imports is negative but insignificant 
indicating little impact from imports on innovation. Although local firms can observe, study, 
imitate and upgrade imported products (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Liu and Buck, 2006), its 
spillover’ effects on technological innovation are also influenced by absorptive capacity (Eaton 
and Kortum, 1996; Liu and Buck, 2006). This may contradict some political viewpoints that 
China’s imitation and acquisition of foreign IP through these channels are the main drivers for 
their own innovation. Rather this activity may boost exports providing a flow of funds to 
domestic firms that they can employ into OFDI and R&D, this again is a subject for further 
investigation. 
Finally, with human capital (HC), one would expect that human capital, in part, drives 
innovation output. Surprisingly, in the presence of OFDI our finding contradicts this regardless 
of lag length. While there are many studies which establishes the role of that domestic human 
development  in innovation (Lai et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2019), in order 
for domestic innovation outputs occur a base level of education, knowledge and knowhow to 
engage with R&D needs to be established. This implies some form of threshold of human 
development as a prerequisite for R&D, exploitation of repatriated technology and innovation 
outputs. We will discuss this under the threshold model next. 
5.3 The technology absorptive capacity threshold effect  
Our interest now turns to the capability of Chinese provinces to absorb technology and whether 
there is a threshold level applying to the productivity gap, human capital and R&D stock. If 
thresholds exist, then we should observe different innovation performances as a province 
crosses a threshold.  
Table 5 reports the results of our single and double threshold tests. Following on from H1 and 
comments on human capital, we find that there is a single threshold indicating that there is 
some minimum level of human development necessary for effective absorption of technology 
from outside sources confirming H1. The existence of one threshold imply that China needs to 
upskill domestic population’s human capital though education and training for technology 
spillover to happen. One could deduce that any developing country attempting to absorb 
foreign technology needs to attain some level of human development to exploit the technology 
effectively. This implies that government policy needs additional impetus towards education, 
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training, knowhow retention and skills development to ‘jump start’ innovation (Li et al., 2016a; 
Zhou et al., 2019).  
R&D also has a threshold indicating that there needs to be a level of R&D investment activity 
in prior years to build R&D capability. This implies that R&D tends to a critical mass where 
ideas, knowhow and people interact in networks to becomes efficient in producing innovative 
outputs. We observe this effect throughout history with clustering in such places as Silicon 
Valley (US) for Computational technology, Detroit (US) in the 1930’s and the Midlands UK 
for vehicle development and Ruhr and Rhine valleys (Germany) for Heavy industry in the early 
part of the 20th century.  
Table 5 – Thresholds Test Results 
Threshold Variable Threshold 𝜽𝒊 95% CI F-statistic 
Productivity Gap 1st 13.85 [13.19, 13.89] 18.53 
 2nd 8.17 [7.550, 8.23] 8.29 
Human Capital stock 1st 6.70 [6.69, 6.71] 59.09*** 
 2nd 6.25 [6.07, 6.57] 21.99 
Research and Development Stock 1st 9.05 [8.67, 9.14] 57.04*** 
 2nd 13.60 [13.60, 13.62] 33.37 
Notes: **, *** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 95% CI = 95% confidence interval. 
In Table 6 we report the results from the interaction of a threshold variable with OFDI using 
the first threshold reported in Table 5. As before, R&D is a substantial contributor to the 
innovative outputs whereas IFDI, IM and EX are not. Although the threshold may not be 
significant the coefficients on either side imply these form a transitional curve. When the 
productivity gap is wide, OFDI make up the shortfall to gain the necessary research outputs to 
increase productivity. We will discuss the potential for OFDI to crowd out innovation later. If 
the productivity gap is small, OFDI has served its purpose in accelerating development to the 
developed country standards. However, this relationship has a breakpoint where OFDI has 
much less effect on output, with a diminishing improvement in innovation as the gap is closed.  
This naturally raises the question, is there a similar threshold for human capital stock and R&D 
as suggested by Table 5 when there is an interaction with OFDI? We observe a threshold in 
both cases (Table 6). Human capital has a pronounced difference in the coefficients indicating 
that OFDI has double the effect when human capital development is low compared to being 
high. Likewise, with R&D, although there is an effect, it is more limited. Note that both human 
capital and R&D coefficients are significant and in the case of HC, particularly pertinent in the 
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presence of the R&D threshold. We can imply that both human capital and R&D are significant 
contributors to innovation when OFDI is present. Therefore, OFDI policy play a significant 
role in developing intellectual capacity and knowhow when appropriate human capital 
development and R&D activities are in place. As the domestic HC and R&D matures OFDI 
effects tail off and China becomes more self-reliant on its own capabilities. We observe this 
with the maturing of Chinese corporations now directly competing in innovation with 
developed nations. Exploiting this channel has and continues to be somewhat of a ‘leg-up’ for 
Chinese innovation.  
Table 6 - The estimates of OFDI technology spillovers for single-threshold 
Variable TH=Productive gap TH= Human capital TH=R&D  
𝑅𝐷 0.55*** 0.53***  
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 0.05 0.05 0.06* 
𝐼𝑀 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 
𝐸𝑋 0.02 0.08 0.09* 
𝐻𝐶 -0.26  1.17*** 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 × 𝑇𝐻 (𝑇𝐻 ≤ 𝜃1) 0.11*** 0.20*** 0.36*** 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 × 𝑇𝐻 (𝑇𝐻 > 𝜃1) 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.22*** 
Constant 1.96 -1.23** -4.69*** 
 𝑅2 0.86 0.85 0.23 
𝑭 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 354.83*** 501.88*** 4.76.27*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
5.4 OFDI, basic and applied research and the innovation technology gap.  
Using the results from H1 and H2, we divide the provinces into groups with large technology 
gap and small technology gap in order to describe how technology gap affects innovation. In 
Table 7, we report the results of running 3SLS for each province clusters to consider separately 
role of applied and basic research and total research, that interaction between applied and basic 
research in explaining technology gap. In addition, we consider OFDI separately and its 
interaction with basic research.  





Separate Interaction Separate Interaction 
𝑰𝑷 𝑨 𝑰𝑷 𝑨 𝑰𝑷 𝑨 𝑰𝑷 𝑨 
𝑰𝑷  0.26*  0.55***  -0.03  -0.35*** 
𝑨 -0.45**    -0.71    
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𝑩 0.94***    0.92    
𝑨 × 𝑩   0.29***    0.09***  
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰 -0.03 -0.89*** 0.01 -0.72*** -0.02 -0.90*** -0.002 -0.99*** 
𝑩 × 𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰  0.83***  0.65***  0.89***  0.99*** 
𝑯 1.01*** 0.10 0.69*** -0.13*** 1.29*** 0.27*** 1.22*** 0.66*** 
𝑯𝑪 -0.56*** 1.03*** -1.10*** 0.95*** 0.37*** 1.04** -0.11*** 2.72*** 
𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 -0.88**  -0.83**  -0.49  -0.51  
𝒑𝑮𝑫𝑷 0.52***  0.35***  0.31***  0.30***  
𝒑𝑰𝑵𝑭 -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.01  -0.01  
𝑪 -0.00 -6.66*** 4.03* -4.65** -0.00 -8.96** -1.09 -19.22** 
𝑹𝟐 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.93 
𝝌𝟐 60511*** 2182*** 2959 1948 3136*** 68675*** 60510*** 1930*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Large and small are separate data 
sets classified by the gap being either wide and narrow between the current Chinese technology and the world. 
Separate and interaction indicates that Applied and basic research are either separate variables with coefficients 
or they are combined into one interaction term with one coefficient. IP and A indicate that the dependent variable 
is IP – intellectual property and A is applied research. C is the intercept or constant. 
In this simultaneous equation models, we consider the effect of the dependent variables IP and 
A on each other first. With large gaps, IP negatively depends on A which is not the same with 
small gaps. On the contrary, A is positively enhanced by IP with large gaps and negatively with 
small gaps when we do not consider the rest of the research (B or A × B). We could infer that 
when the gap is large then possibly imported IP, that is locally registered is then exploited for 
applied research. The more applied research activity there is the less that imported IP is needed 
and firms focus on improving their processes and knowhow in production. This theory could 
possibly be further enhanced if one considers that basic research in large gaps is a significant 
contributor to IP and this is the mechanism that drives more applied research (Nelson, 1959). 
Somewhere there may be an equilibrium growth path in research and its outputs that affect the 
interaction between IP and applied research. Although moderate in comparison, the interaction 
between applied and basic research has a positive outcome on IP. If a small gap is a situation 
where all research has matured, then the production of IP from the combination of applied and 
basic research is moderated inferring that it becomes increasingly harder to find new 
innovations that warrant IP and the focus becomes more on taking basic research through to its 
application and then into production. Possibly, the negative driver that IP has on applied 
research is that research is not as important when the gap is small.  
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Moving next to OFDI, such investment has a negative impact on applied research regardless 
of technology, however little impact on IP. However, when we take into account basic research, 
this negative impact turns positive indicating that basic research is a significant driver of 
applied research regardless of the technology gap. This result lead us to devise additional an 
additional hypothesis regarding basic and applied research with regard to OFDI and IP which 
we will explore later. 
Next, accounting for the labour force and human capital, the role of the state and the state of 
the economy.  An interesting observation is that employment (H) has a positive effect on IP in 
both large and small gap scenarios (approximately 30% more influence in small gaps) and 
contributes to small gap applied research. In contrast, human capital is negative in large gap 
contributions to IP and positive with applied research suggesting and possibly reinforcing the 
view that the large gap provinces largely import IP and then apply it though applied research. 
Once the domestic economy develops and the gap is small then human capital and employment 
contribute to both IP and applied research reinforcing the view that basic research has a material 
need for human capital development when the gap is wide (Kim, 1998; Girma et al., 2001; 
Hermes and Lensink, 2003). 
Finally, considering the state and economy’s role in the development of IP and applied 
research. As one would expect, growing GDP would have a positive influence with both large 
and small gaps, inflation only in large gaps. The result that contradict with the norm is that 
state investment has a negative impact when there is large gaps while there is no impact with 
small gaps. This seems to imply that the state somehow displaces new developments. However, 
if the theory that IP is imported holds when the gap is large, then the state could be involved in 
developing the basic and applied research capacity, which might go some way to explain the 
dynamics. When the gap is small then the state’s role becomes irrelevant, again theorising, 
research capacity is most likely self-sustaining rather than needing government intervention 
relative to how it might have been done in large gap provinces.  
5.4.1 Applied and basic research, their roles in the technology gap 
Extending H3, we consider the role of basic research as the instrument rather than applied 
research. We report the results in Table 8. 
Table 8 - Role of basic research: 3SLS analysis of the grouping in the frontier technology distance 
 Large Small 
Separate Interaction Separate Interaction 
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Dependent 𝑰𝑷 𝑩 𝑰𝑷 𝑩 𝑰𝑷 𝑩 𝑰𝑷 𝑩 
𝑰𝑷  0.05  0.85***  0.05  0.47*** 
𝑨 -0.71*** 0.53***  0.37*** -7.41 0.76***  0.70*** 
𝑩 1.61***    9.71    
𝑨 × 𝑩   0.29***    0.14***  
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰 -0.11***  0.08***  -0.26  0.003  
𝑨 × 𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰  0.01***  -0.002  0.001  0.001 
𝑯 0.71*** 0.02 0.64*** -0.67*** 0.29 0.02 1.15*** -0.54*** 
𝑯𝑪 -0.45 -0.57** -0.95*** -0.70** -15.78 1.70*** -0.26 -0.42 
𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 -1.20**  -1.44***  0.79  0.44  
𝒑𝑮𝑫𝑷 0.42***  0.14**  0.14  0.25***  
𝒑𝑰𝑵𝑭 -0.05***  -0.03**  0.07  -0.02  
𝑪 -0.92 6.16*** 3.20 8.73 100.16 -10.78*** -1.22 -4.92 
𝑅2 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.89 -3.35 0.95 0.87 0.93 
𝜒2 2137*** 2032*** 2912*** 1441*** 329*** 3463*** 1300*** 3069*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Large and small are separate data 
sets classified by the gap being either wide and narrow between the current Chinese technology and the world. 
Separate and interaction indicates that applied and basic research are either separate variables with coefficients or 
they are combined into one interaction term with one coefficient. IP and B indicate that the dependent variable is 
IP – intellectual property and A is applied research. C is the intercept or constant. 
When compared with Table 7, results in Table 8 shows that IP effect magnifies while 
employment and human capital effects are moderated without interactions. When the 
instrument is basic research and is the dependent variable, then applied research, OFDI and 
human capital play a significant positive role whereas IP does not. Basic research has a 
significant role in developing IP (first column) and the mechanism for enhancing OFDI and 
human capital in IP development is though basic research. This potentially reinforces the 
argument that governments should encourage OFDI spillovers into the local economy and 
human capital development in the provinces to develop their economy and close the gap. 
Considering the interaction between applied and basic research, this is a driver for IP activity 
and IP with applied research has a significant positive impact on basic research. Contrary to 
Table 7, when the gap is large, human capital has a negative impact on basic research. This 
presence a policy conundrum where when provinces focus resources on applied research but it 
has a negative impact on IP and basic research.   As basic research is the core driver of IP and 
gap, it is not supported by human capital development. One could surmise that the specialist 
nature of basic research involves such a small part of the working population that the effects 
would be minimal.  
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5.4.2 Research analysis and discussion 
When productivity gap is small human capital play no role in IP development however, it 
becomes significant in affecting basic research. Moreover, one could question the role of IP 
there is no causation and does not contribute to basic research. This implies that there is a 
structural change in the dynamics of the provincial economies suggesting that the threshold is 
likely to uncover differences. Taking the interaction model, IP and applied research have a 
significant positive impact although the magnitude depends on the level of technology gap with 
smaller gap having limited impact. To theorizes this finding we consider the following 
scenario: a province with a large gap might find that human capital development is detrimental 
to basic research and decide to limit the investment. Such a decision will affect both applied 
research and growth and as the technology gap narrows and the demand from basic research 
for human knowhow will increases. There are substantial policy implications in the support of 
R&D with the effects from the underpinning resources to support both applied and basic 
research in a growing economy.  
Some explanation of this basic research impact could come from Higón (2016). Although his 
was for the Spanish economy, there are some parallels in product pioneering in low to medium 
technology sectors. A developing country with a large gap may not have the necessary 
‘infrastructure’ to conduct cutting edge high-tech research as compared with developed 
nations. This creates opportunities for developing countries to develop new products by 
undertaking pioneering research on low-tech industries.  
We concur with Czarnitzki and Thorwarth (2012) that basic research leads to other R&D, 
however we find that if applied research comes to the fore, then this has a detrimental effect on 
IP development. Furthermore, importing knowhow may not be good for IP development 
(Higón 2016). We observe that ‘importing’ (OFDI) has a negative effect on applied research 
as in Table 7 across the board, whereas if interacted with basic research then there is a positive 
contribution. In Table 8, we observe that OFDI has a negative impact on IP (separate) and 
positive in the interaction model. These effects are somewhat more limited that in Table 7. In 
all cases basic research is fundamental to driving technological innovation and not OFDI or 
applied research. This is most evident when the technology gap is large. Note however, that 
applied research is instrumental in driving basic research although it is detrimental to 
technological innovation.  
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As with Cassiman et al. (2002), we support the view that basic research with the addition of 
OFDI contributes to applied research and that applied research enhances basic research. This 
potentially complements the results of Henard and McFadyen (2005). Applied research is 
greatly enhanced by human capital in contrast to basic research and technological innovation, 
that human capital affects in a detrimental way. One could conjecture that Stern’s (2004) view 
that lower salaries in basic research are less attractive. We may suggest that those best placed 
for basic research may seek alternatives with applied research when the gap is large. Maybe 
basic research is in its infancy when the gap is large. When the gap is small then basic research 
benefits from the human capital stock implying that the demand for highly skilled researchers 
needs to be matched with an equivalent supply for there to be gains in research output. As with 
Cassiman et al. (2002), the investment decisions of a firm in applied or basic research or, IP 
have a direct effect on the absorptive capacity. We find that the interaction between basic 
research and OFDI is the catalyst that drives both applied research and technological 
innovation. Policies that support firms conducting basic research in conjunction with a ‘go-out’ 
OFDI policy are more likely to benefit provincial, as well as national, growth. 
6 Conclusion and policy implications 
Our findings are that OFDI has both a national and provincial potential to contribute to 
improvement in technological innovation with appropriate regional policies. Although national 
governments may have an overall strategy, it can only work if regions (or provinces as in 
China) are able to adapt to the local conditions and circumstances. As such, regions will close 
the gap at different rates depending on policies expanding on the ideas set out in Piperopoulos 
et al. (2018). OFDI, by itself, has a negative effect on regional technological innovation. As 
such, repatriation of knowhow is reliant on the ability of the provincial, regional and national 
economy to absorb such knowledge and skills. Our conclusion is that for OFDI to be effective, 
it needs basic research to be the key channel through which absorption enters into the local 
economy and policy makers need to put in place necessary motivations and environment to 
connect OFDI with technology spillovers. Failure to do so could lead to OFDI crowding out 
research. 
An aspect of IP, OFDI and R&D is that they do not form a linear relationship. Instead, there is 
a base level of provincial R&D and human capital which creates absorptive capacity required 
for efficient and effective uptake of repatriated knowhow. This constraints policy makers in 
their investment into human capital and R&D to a maximum level as any higher will saturate 
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the market and crowd out productive activities. As noted in the additional H3.1, applied and 
basic research have different demands on human capital and R&D depending on the threshold 
and distribution of research between applied and basic. Therefore, policies must be balanced 
between motivating domestic firms to ‘go-global’ with an OFDI strategy to appropriate 
technology knowhow whilst encouraging domestic R&D and supporting human capital 
development. OFDI must not be motivated to crowd out local development as we might 
observe in some of the provinces. Our threshold model enhances the viewpoints of Phene and 
Almeida (2008) with the addition of a regional perspective and thresholds. 
Further to this it is necessary to consider the impact of OFDI spillovers and scientific research 
on technological innovation according to different absorptive capabilities. We demonstrate that 
technological absorptive capacity relies on the level of regional technological development, 
frontier technological distance and resources such as human capital and R&D stock. Policies 
need to account for regional variation. Our policy recommendations are that for large gap 
provinces, they should focus more on the investment into basic research to improve their 
technology levels and technology absorptive capability to ensure further development and 
better use of OFDI for technology spillovers. Provinces in the small technology group should 
consider the optimal allocation of resources for applied research, basic research and OFDI. 
Their technological development levels are initially relatively high, indicating their previous 
successful efforts in basic research. Therefore, they can try to find the balance between applied 
research and basic research to facilitate an efficient use of resources; they should not ignore 
the important role of basic research for long-run technological development and its positive 
impact on OFDI spillovers because it strengthens the absorptive capacity. Firms from those 
provinces should also be rational when considering conducting OFDI. They are supposed to 
comprehensively analyse the joint effects of basic research, applied research and OFDI 
spillovers according to their own development levels and conditions although it is difficult to 
do so, especially when the government is encouraging OFDI because it boosts overall 
technological progress.  
As to the domestic policy regarding infrastructure, education, human development and R&D 
capability, we demonstrate that there are different thresholds where, at a provincial level, the 
ability to absorb efficiently is compromised when one or more elements is below that threshold. 
This is cogent with the view expressed in Baskaran and Chaarlas (2012), as policy makers need 
to consider the pre-existing R&D intensity (that includes human capital) to fully assimilate 
OFDI technologies. We add to the policy view in that policy makers must consider if their 
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province or region is above or below the threshold.  It could be quite feasible that a policy 
maker would progressively change their strategy, altering the disposition of ‘investments’ as 
they progress. As with China, and drawing parallels into the Indian sub-continent, such 
‘investments’ need not only consider the national perspective, we demonstrate that policy 
makers need to account for regional differences in capability and not a ‘one-size fits all’ 
approach to OFDI and its supporting policies.  
Although OFDI policies in China have been successful in short-cutting the route to developing 
world capabilities, it has drawn much criticism and resentment. Complaints about foreign 
ownership, state controlled commercial spying and IP theft to name a few. Recent trade 
restrictions imposed by America and others may have a long-term attenuating effect on OFDI 
and the ‘go-out’ policy. This may give other developing nations time to ‘catch up’ and exploit 
the opportunities that China has developed. One cannot separate international politics from 
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